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Copple: S Corporation Shareholders

S CORPORATION SHAREHOLDERS AND ENTITY-LEVEL
INDEBTEDNESS: IS A SHAREHOLDER EVER ALLOWED TO DEDUCT
LOSSES AGAINST ENTITY-LEVEL INDEBTEDNESS?

by
SUMNER E. COPPLE III, J.D., LL.M.
INTRODUCTION

The owner of a closely-held business does not generally consider the tax implications when it is necessary to obtain financing for his business. A loan is negotiated and
the borrowed funds are put to use by the business. However, in the case of a third-party
loan to an S corporation,' different tax consequences may greet taxpayers conducting
business as an S corporation, depending on the form of the loan transaction. Business
owners adopting the S corporation form of doing business may discover that operating
losses of the entity cannot be deducted due to the form of loan transactions between their
corporation and third-party lenders. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the current
state of the law with respect to a shareholder's ability to utilize entity-level indebtedness
for the purpose of deducting S corporation losses currently.
Prior to the enactment of Subchapter S, a study completed by the Treasury Department in 1946 suggested that treating an electing corporation as a partnership and its
shareholders as partners would be appropriate for most closely held corporations.2
Although technical and administrative considerations argue against the use of the partnership approach for corporations with a large number of shareholders or a complex
capital structure, closely held corporations and their shareholders were seen as one
economic identity with little real difference (other than the concept of limited liability)
from a partnership and its partners.
The legislative history and statutory framework of Subchapter S indicate that the
partnership approach was adopted by Congress forthe taxation of electing corporations. 3
This legislative history indicates that Congress was interested in providing small business owners the opportunity to choose the form of doing business without regard to the
tax consequences.' The enactment of Subchapter S was, at least in part, designed to
remedy the problem faced by small business owners experiencing operating losses when
doing business as a corporation.5 The losses that would otherwise be trapped in the
corporation could, by utilizing the provisions of the newly enacted Subchapters S, be
I

Reference to Subchapter S refer to 26 U.S.C.. Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchapter S.

2 RICHARD B. GOoDE, TiE PosTWAR CORPORATION TAX STRUCTURE (1946).

SubchapterS provisions specifically referto provisions applicable to partners and partnerships. Forexample, LR.C.
§1372 treats shareholders as partners for purposes of mles regarding employee fringe benefits. I.R.C. § 1372 (1988).
See also S. REP.No. 1983,85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), 1958-3 C.B. 922,1008; H.R. REP. No. 826,97th Cong., 2d.
Sess., at 6 (1982). 1982-2 C.B. 730; S. REP. No. 640,97th Cong., 2d. Sess., at 6 (1982). 1982-2 C.B. 718.
4 S. RER No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958-3 C.B. 922, 1008.
'

Id.
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utilized by the small business owner to offset other taxable income. According to the
legislative history, losses generated by the electing subchapter S corporation should be
utilized by the shareholders to the extent of their "investment in the corporation." The
committee reports state that a shareholder's investment in the corporation includes
7
shareholder loans to the corporation.

Out of this legislative history and statutory framework grew the shibboleth that for
tax purposes a shareholder in an S corporation is treated like a partner in a partnership.
However, for federal tax purposes shareholders are not treated like partners in all respects. For example, a partner cannot be an employee of the partnership; all operating
income of the partnership is taxed to its general partners as self-employment income!
Active shareholders in an Scorporation, on the other hand, can be treated as employees
for purposes of withholding social security and federal income tax from amounts received for services rendered to the corporation. No self-employment tax is due, however,
on the shareholder's distributive share of S corporation taxable income.9 Transfers to an
S corporation by a shareholder and distributions from an S corporation to a shareholder
are treated differently than similar transactions between a partnership and its partners. 1°
With respect to entity-level debt, significantly different tax' consequences greet the
S corporation shareholder and a similarly situated partner. In the case of a partner, an
increase in his share of partnership liabilities is treated as a contribution ofmoney to the
partnership. 1 Thus, an increase in entity-level debt provides a partner with additional
tax basis in his partnership interest against which his distributive share of partnership
losses can be currently utilized.'2 Like a partner, an S corporation shareholder is allowed
3
to deduct his share of corporate operating losses to the extent ofhis tax basis in the entity.1
However, with the exception of a loan from a shareholder to his S corporation, no

o Id. at 1141.
Id.
I.R.C. § 1402(a) (1988 &Supp. III 1991);Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-l(a)(2) (as amendedin 1974).
Rev. Rul. 59-221,1959-1 C.B. 225. Since a shareholder's distributive share of S Corporation income is not subject
to self-employment taxes, the Service is interested in making sure shareholder/employees do not undercompensate
themselves in orderto avoid employmenttaxes. As a result, the Service will recharacterize a shareholder's distributive
share of S Corporation income as wages when the shareholder is not adequately compensated for his services. Rev.
Rul. 74-44,1974-1 C.B. 287.
,0 Compare I.R.C. §§ 351 and 357 with I.R.C. §§ 721,752 (with respect to contributions to the entity). I.R.C. §§
351,357,721,752 (1988 & Supp. IT 1991). Compare I.R.C. §§ 301,302 and 311 with I.R.C. § 731 (with respect
to distributions from the entity). I.R.C. §§301,302,311,731(1988).
n I.R.C. § 752(a) (1988). A partner's share of partnership debt is not easily detennined. See Treas. Reg. § 1.7521(1956).
12 I.R.C. §§ 722,704(d) (1988). A partner's distributive share of partnership loss in excess of the adjusted basis in
his partnership interest is disallowed and carried forward until the partner's additional capital contributions, additional partnership income, or additional liabilities provide tax basis in the partner's partnership interest.
3 I.R.C. § 1366(d) (1988).
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increase in basis arises from an increase in corporate-level borrowing. 14 Consequently,
a shareholder's distributive share of his corporation's operating loss in excess of his
capital contribution may not be currently deducted due to a lack ofbasis.15 Whereas had
the shareholders chosen the partnership form of doing business, the loss may have been

deducted against basis provided by entity-level debt incurred after the initial capital
contribution. Many taxpayers, under the mistaken belief that as an S corporation shareholderthey are treated like apartner in a partnership, are surprised to learn that third-party

entity-level indebtedness will not provide them with tax basis against which their share
of the corporation's loss may be deducted.
Not surprisingly, taxpayers have sought to deduct their share of S corporationlosses

currently by taking the position that a third-party debt incurred by their corporation is,
in substance, an investment by the shareholder.16 The Internal Revenue Service has been
unwilling to treat a third-party loan to an S corporation as an investment by the shareholders and has disallowed losses claimed by shareholders with insufficient tax basis in

their corporations from direct capital contributions or shareholder loans.
DISCUSSION
Third-PartyDebt Generally

The statutory provision dealing with the pass-through of an S corporation's losses
to its shareholders is relatively straight-forward.1 7 Section 1366(d)(1) allows a shareholder of an S corporation to deduct currently his distributive share of S corporation

Id. There is no counterpart to I.R.C. § 752 in Subchapter S.
n Disallowed losses from an S corporation are carried forward until sufficient basis exists against which the loss
can be taken. LR.C. § 1366(d)(2) (1988).
M See, e.g., Blum v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 436 (1972); Perry v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1293 (1970); Raynor v.
Commissioner, 50 T.C. 762 (1968).
' The relevant Code section provides:
(d) SPECIAL RULES FOR LOSSES AND DEDUCTIONS.
(1) Cannot exceed shareholder's basis in stock and debt. The aggregate amount of losses and
deductions taken into account by a shareholder under subsection (a) for any taxable year shall not
exceed the sum of:
(A) the adjusted basis ofthe shareholder's stock in the S corporation (determined
with regard to paragraph (1) of section 1367(a) for the taxable year), and
(B) the shareholder's adjusted basis of any indebtedness of the S corporation to
the shareholder (determined without regard toany adjustmentunderparagraph (2)
of section 1367(b) for the taxable year).
(2) Indefinite carryover of disallowed losses and deductions. Any loss or deduction which is
disallowed for any taxable year by reason of paragraph (1) shall be treated as incurred by the
corporation in the succeeding taxable year with respect to that shareholder.
LR.C. § 1336(d) (1988).
"
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losses to the extent of the shareholder's adjusted basis in his stock and indebtedness of
the S corporation to the shareholder.1 8
Faced with the prospect of disallowed S corporation losses due to insufficient basis
under § 1366(d)(1), shareholders have sought to obtain basis for purposes of currently
deducting their share of S corporation loss by arguing that a third-party loan to their
corporation should be treated as a shareholder loan under §1366(d)(1)(B). 9 Alternatively, shareholders have argued that a third-party loan should be treated for tax purposes
as a loan to the shareholder followed by a capital contribution by the shareholder, giving
rise to basis under §1366(d)(1)(A) ° A shareholder arguing for the application of
§ 1366(d)(1) to a third party loan usually has co-signed the note to the third-party lender
and guaranteed the loan. In most of the cases dealing with the application of § 1366(d)(1)
to third-party loans the lender relied on the financial strength of the shareholder in
extending credit to the S corporation and obtained collateral from the shareholder to
strengthen the loan.
The courts have been unwilling to treat third-party loans as shareholder loans under
§ 1366(d)(1)(B). 21In Raynor v. Commissioner,the Tax Court held that a taxpayer who
guaranteed payment of a third-party loan to his S corporation could not treat the loan as
a shareholderloan. Although the corporation's books reflected the money received from
the third party lender as an indebtedness to the shareholder, the court reasoned that, "No
form of indirect borrowing, be it guaranty, surety, accommodation, co-making or otherwise, gives rise to indebtedness from the corporation to the shareholder until and
Priorto that crucial act, 'liability'
unless the shareholders pay part or all of the obligation.
22
shareholders."
the
to
may exist, but not debt
Since Raynor,shareholders have been unsuccessful in their attempts to obtain basis
from third-party debt by arguing that what was in form a third-party loan was, in sub-

stance, a loan to the shareholder followed by a loan to their corporation. 23 However, the
outcome is clouded when the shareholder argues that the third party loan is, in substance,
a loan by the third party to the shareholder followed by a capital contribution (rather than
a loan) by the shareholder to his S corporation. Although some authority exists for
treating a third-party loan to an S corporation as an indirect capital contribution by the
regarding the determination of a shareholder's adjusted basis in his
"S Internal Revenue Code § 1367 provides rules
stock and any loans to the corporation. See I.R.C. § 1367 (1988). Recently issued regulations provide guidance
relating to the adjustments required by §1367, but do not address whether entity-level indebtedness affects a
shareholder's basis in stock or shareholder loans. See Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1367-1 and 1.1367-2 (1992).
" Raynor, 50 T.C. at 770. The taxpayer argues that the transaction should be viewed as a loan from the third party
to the shareholder/taxpayer, followed by a shareholder loan to his corporation. Id.
2 Blun, 59 T.C. at 438.
2' Raynor, 50 T.C. at 762; Blun, 59 T.C.at 436.
22 Raynor, 50T.C. at 770,771.
' No reported case has allowed a taxpayer to deduct losses against athird-party loan under I.R.C. § 1366(d)(1)(B).
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shareholder, the weight of authority (at least when one counts the number of cases
deciding the issue) is against the shareholder attempting to apply §1366(d)(1)(A)
to a third-party loan.'
Applicationof Debt-EquityPrinciples
The use ofdebt-equity principles to characterize a transferof money to a corporation
has had statutory support since 1970.25 Section 385(b) lists five factors to be considered

in determining whether a transfer of money to a corporation should be treated as a
transaction creating a debtor-creditor relationship or a corporation-shareholder relationship . 6 Prior to the enactment of §385, case law had established a set of factors used to
determine whether a transfer of funds to a corporation should be treated as debt or
equity.? These factors are used as guidelines rather than requirements in determining the
tax treatment accorded a given transaction involving the debt-equity issue.2
1. Loans to a C Corporation
The debt-equity issue has been raised in the context of a third-party loan to a C
corporation. In PlantationPatterns,Inc. v. UnitedStates,29 the shareholder of a newly
formed corporation guaranteed loans made to the corporation to finance the purchase of
assets to be used in the business of manufacturing wrought iron funiture. 0 The corporation was thinly capitalized and the guaranteed loans were subordinated to the other
debts of the corporation. 1
The court used debt-equity principles to determine that the guaranteed loan transaction was, in substance, a loan to the shareholder followed by a capital contribution by the
shareholder in an amount equal to the amount of the loan.32 Consequently, payments
Selfe v. United States, 778 F.2d 769 (llth Cir. 1985), and Blum v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 436 (1972), state a
willingness, in appropriate circumstances, to consider a third-party loan as an indirect capital contribution by a
shareholder. But see Harris v. United States, 902 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1990); Leavitt v. United States, 875 F.2d 420 (4th
Cir. 1989); Brown v. Commissioner, 706 E2d 755 (6th Cir. 1983), (where the shareholders were unsuccessful in
attempts to convince the court that third-party loans should be treated as indirect capital contributions).
2 See I.R.C. § 385 (1988 & Supp. M11991) (enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L No. 91-172, §415(a)).
Id. The five factors are:
(1)... whether there is a written, unconditional promise to pay a sum certain on demand or on a
24

specified date, and to pay interest; (2) ... whether the transaction purporting to be a loan creates a

subordinated or preferred status with respect to the transferred funds; (3) ... the debt/equity ratio
of the corporation; (4)... whetherthepurported debtis convertible into stock; (5)... the relationship
between the holdings of stock in the corporation and the holdings of debt.

Id.
2

See Montclair, Inc. v. Commissioner, 318 F2d 38 (5th Cir. 1963).
yler v. Tomlinson, 414 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1969).

462 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972).
IId. at 713.
31 Id.
" Id. at 718.
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made by the corporation to the third-party lender were taxed to the shareholder as
dividend distributions. 33 In finding the loan transaction to be a deemed capital contribution, the court stated:
Certainly we recognize that this transaction was initially cast to have all of
the outward appearances of a debt transaction, complete with instruments
styled "debentures" which had fixed maturity dates. But these surface
considerations do not end ourexamination. Closer scrutiny establishes that
the other factors which would give the transaction the aura of debt are
4
noticeable by their absence.
The court found the following factors to bedeterminative in recastingthe transaction
as a capital contribution: 1) The money was spent for capital assets; 2) Because of the
thin capitalization of the corporation the third-party lender looked to the guarantee as the
real source of repayment; 3) There was an identity of interest between the shareholder
and the guarantor.'
2. Loans to an S Corporation
The debt-equity question normally arises in the context ofa direct transfer of money
by a shareholder to his corporation. The question in this factual setting is whether the
transfer by the shareholder should be treated as a shareholder loan or a capital contribution. In the case of a corporation for which an S election is not in effect, the resolution
of the debt-equity issue has significant tax consequences: subsequent payments by the
corporation to the shareholder are treated as either the repayment of debt (non-taxable
to the shareholder) or as a distribution with respect to the shareholder's stock (likely
taxable as a dividend to the shareholder). The shareholderofan Scorporation who makes
a direct transfer of money to his corporation is not as concerned about the resolution of
the debt-equity issue since corporate earnings are generally distributed tax-free to an S
shareholder and since corporate operating losses are deductible by the shareholder
against both his stock basis and his basis in shareholder loans.
An S corporation shareholder's interest in the debt-equity issue is heightened considerably when the transaction involves a third-party loan to the corporation. If the debtequity issue is resolved in favor of debt, there is a third-party loan rather than a shareholder loan .3 If the debt-equity issue is resolved in favor of equity, there is a deemed

11Id. at 722.
3 Id.
35

Id.

11

See Blum v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 436 (1972).
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capital contribution by the shareholder. In the context of a third-party loan to an S
corporation, the resolution of the debt-equity issue may be crucial to a shareholder
seeking a current tax deduction for corporate operating losses. If an S shareholder were
allowed to treat a third-party loan as a capital contribution, the loan transaction might
provide the necessary stock basis against whichhis distributive share of the corporation's
operating loss could be deducted.

The first case to deal squarely with the application of §13 66(d)(1)(A) to a third-party
entity-level loan was Blum v. Commissioner.' In Blum, the taxpayer, the sole shareholder of an S corporation that raised and raced horses, had guaranteed bank loans made
to the corporation." The loans were made at a time when the corporation was insolvent
and thinly capitalized. 4 The taxpayer was required to pledge property other than his S
corporation stock as collateral for the loan made by the bank.4 The Service denied the
deduction claimed by the taxpayer for the corporation's operating loss that exceeded the
taxpayer's original capital contribution. 42 The taxpayer argued that he had sufficient
basis against which the losses could be claimed since the third party loans guaranteed
by him were, in substance, either indebtedness of the corporation to him or loans to him
followed by capital contributions to the corporation.43
The Tax Court disposed ofthe taxpayer's first argument, that the bank loan was, in
substance, a shareholder loan, citing Raynor." The court held that in the absence of a
showing that the debt ran directly to the taxpayer, the debt was not an indebtedness of
the corporation to the stockholder under 1366(d)(1)(B).'
The Tax Court then addressed the taxpayer's alternative argument, that the loan was,
in substance, a loan to him followed by a capital contribution to the corporation under
§1366(d)(1)(A).46 The Tax Court acknowledged the efficacy of such an argument in the
context of a third-party loan to an S corporation:

17 See Selfe v. United States, 778 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1985). Selfe did not actually resolve the issue in favor of the
taxpayer. However, in remanding the case the Court stated that a resolution of the debt-equity issue in favor of equity

would provide basis to the shareholder under I.R.C. § 1366(d)(1)(A). Id. at 774.
3' Blwn, 59 T.C. at 436. Actually, the case dealt with the application of .R.C. § 1374(cX2)(A), the statutory
predecessor to §1366(d)(1)(A). See § 1374, prior to amendment by the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L
No. 97-354,96 Stat. 1669 (1982).
" Blunt, 59 T.C. at 437.
40 Id.
41 Id.
12 Id. at 438.
43 Id.
4

Id.

4s Biwn, 59 T.C. at 438.
"
Id.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1993

7

Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 10 [1993], Art. 1

AKRON TAX JoURNAL

[Vol. 10

Petitioner has not cited and we have not found any cases in which the debtequity determination was resorted to for purposes of increasing a
shareholder's loss basis in a subchapter S corporation. However, regardless
of the context in which a debt-equity determination arises, we can see no
distinction in principle between the case before us and the numerous cases
in the area which serve as judicial guideposts.47
However, the Tax Court determined the taxpayer had simply not shown that application of traditional debt-equity principles to the facts presented compelled the court to
hold the bank loan to be, in substance, a capital contribution providing basis to the
taxpayer for purposes of § 1366(d)(1)(A):
As we stated in Santa Anita consolidated, Inc. supra at 550, "Whether such
debt [guaranteed debt] is to be treated as an indirect capital contribution
must be resolved by an investigation of the facts in light of traditional debtequity principles." In the present and fully stipulated case, after applying
many of those traditional principles, we find that petitioner simply has not
caried his burden of proof and has not convinced this court that the guaranteed loans should be properly characterized as equity investments.
The court found it significant that no evidence was offered to show the bank expected
repayment of its loan from the shareholder. 49 Based on the evidence offered, application
of debt-equity principles did not serve to increase the basis of the taxpayer's stock.
The decision inBlum v. Commissioneris similarly significant in that the Tax Court,
for the first time, recognized that, in the context of an S corporation and its shareholder,
the use of debt-equity principles is appropriate to recharacterize a third-party loan to a
corporation as a contribution by the shareholder. The problem for the taxpayer in Blum
was that he failed to provide evidence sufficient to recharacterize the loan as an indirect
capital contribution.
3. Economic Outlay
In the case of Brown v. UnitedStates, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's
holding that shareholders could not deduct losses against a third-party loan guaranteed
by the shareholders. 5' The shareholders had asserted that debt-equity principles should

17

Id. at 439.

11 Id. at 440.
s

706 F.2d 755 (6th Cir. 1983).

5 Id. at 757.
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serve to recharacterize the third-party loan as an indirect capital contribution and cited
Blum as support for their position. 2
The Tax Court in Brown, citedRaynor for the proposition that an economic outlay
is required before an S shareholder can receive basis under §1366(d)(1)(B) and that a
guarantee of the debt of anundercapitalized corporation does not amount to an economic
outlay.53 With regard to the debt-equity argument, the Tax Court simply stated that Blum
was not inconsistent with the nile stated in Raynor.- The Tax Court concluded that,
based on the facts, the substance of the transaction matched its form and recharacterizing
the loan as an indirect capital contribution would be inappropriate.55
In affirming the decisionof theTax Court, the Sixth Circuit accepted theTax Court's
finding that the substance of the loan transaction matched the form and therefore no
capital contribution by the shareholders occurred.5 6 However, after citing several cases
that address taxpayers' claims that third-party loans should be treated as shareholder
loans, the Sixth Circuit concluded: "In any event, we hold that guaranteeing shareholders
must make actual disbursements on the corporate indebtedness before they can augment
their bases for the purpose of deducting net operating losses under [§ 1366(d)(1)]."5
In light of the fact that the appellate court in Brown agreed with the Tax Court's
finding that the substance of the loan transaction matched its form, the holding quoted
above could be viewed as merely reiterating the well established rule that guaranteeing
a corporate debt will not be treated as a shareholder loan under §1366(d)(1)(B). However, the court's holding refers to §1366(d)(1) - not § 1366(d)(1)(B) - and therefore one
could conclude the Sixth Circuit requires actual disbursements by a shareholder before
treating the loan as a capital contribution under traditional debt-equity analysis. Such
an expansion of the Tax Court's holding would seem unwarranted in light of the factual
determination that the substance of the loan transaction met its form. Nevertheless, in
its rebuke of the taxpayer's reliance on Blum, the Sixth Circuit stated that Blum does not
depart from the economic outlay requirement. 5

SId.at 756.
Id.

'Brown v.Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (P-H) 1981-2359, aftd, 706 F.2d 755 (6th Cir.1983). Blwn isnot inconsistent
with Raynor. However, Blwn does say more about debt-equity principles ina case involving an SCorporation than
does Raynor; Raynor never addresses the issue.
" See id. at 2360.
-6 Brown, 706 F.2d at 756.
IJd. at 757.
sU Id. at 756. In discussing Blwn, the Sixth Circuit states,"... in deciding that Blwn was not entitled to a stepped-

up basis because of his guaranty, the Tax Court emphasized that the bank expected repayment of its loan from the
corporation and not the petitioner." Id. (citing Blum 59 T.C. at 440). The implication of this statement seems to be
that the Sixth Circuit feels an economic outlay is made by a shareholder when the bank expects repayment from the
shareholder.
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S ShareholderGuaranteesof Third-PartyLoans
1. Positive Responses
The case most often cited by S corporation shareholders attempting to convert a
third-party loan into a capital contribution under debt-equity principles is Selfe v. United
States. 9 In Selfe, the taxpayer, intending to operate a retail clothing business, arranged
financing with a bank whereby the bank agreed to loan her $120,000 (a line of credit).'
To secure the loan the taxpayer pledged stock in another corporation which she owned.6
After arranging the loan, the business was incorporated and an election to be taxed as a
S corporation was made.62 At the bank's request, the line of credit was converted to a
corporate loan.63 According to testimony from the loan officer, the bank wanted the
assurance of having the corporation primarily liable on the loan."
The taxpayer claimed the deduction for her distributive share of the corporation's
operating loss that exceeded her original capital contribution to the corporation." However, the Service denied her deduction. When the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Service's position, the taxpayer appealed."
The taxpayer argued the loan should be treated as though it was made to her and that
she transferred the loan proceeds to her corporation as a capital contribution.67 In
essence, the taxpayer urged the Court to apply traditional debt-equity principles in
determining whether the loan transaction was, in substance, an indirect capital contribution." The taxpayer pointed to the testimony of the loan officer that the bank loan was
secured by the taxpayer's property and that the bank was looking primarily to the
taxpayer and her pledged stock for repayment of the loan.69
The Eleventh Circuit Court in Selfe remanded the case to the district court. 70 In so
doing, the Court concluded, ". . . under the principles of PlantationPatterns,a shareholder who has guaranteed a loan to a Subchapter S Corporation may increase her basis
-' 778 F.2d 769 (llth Cir. 1985).
60 Id.at 770.
61 Id.

6a Id.

6

Id.

"

Id. at 771.

63 Id.
"

Id. at 770.

Id. at 771.
Id. The taxpayer cited Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Commissioner, 462 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1972), as authority for
applying debt-equity principles to a case involving third-party loans guaranteed by the shareholder when the facts and
circumstance indicate that the lender looks primarily to the shareholder for repayment. Selfe, 778 F.2d at 771.
6 Selfe.778 F.2dat771.
70 Id. at 775.
7

"
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where the facts demonstrate that, in substance, the shareholder has borrowed funds and
subsequently advanced them to her corporation." 71 The Court was not persuaded by the
Service's argument that characterizing the transaction under debt-equity principles was
inappropriate in the case of an S corporation. 72
According to the Eleventh Circuit, shareholders who guarantee third-party loans to
their corporation are generally unsuccessful inrecharacterizing the guarantee as a capital
contribution because the taxpayer cannot show that the substance of the transaction
differs from its form .73 However, when the lender looks primarily to the shareholder as
the source for repayment of the loan, an analysis of the substance ofthe transaction under
debt-equity principles mustbe engaged into determine if an equity investment was made
by the shareholder.74
2. Negative Responses
The cases decided since the Selfe decision have not rushed to embrace the notion
that guaranteed debt can be characterized as a capital contribution for purposes of
§1366(d)(1)(A). In Baderv. Commissioner5 the taxpayers formed a corporation for the
practice of radiology.76 They contributed, in the aggregate, $2,000 in exchange for their
stock.' The corporation made a proper election to be treated as an S corporation, and,
each shareholder borrowed, individually, $75,000 from a bank.'

The shareholders

immediately loaned the borrowed funds to their newly formed corporation. 9 Approximately seven months after the original bank loans, the taxpayers' loan agreements were
consolidated into one bank loan.' The corporation was listed as the primary obligor in
the new loan agreement; the taxpayers were listed as guarantors."1 The corporation
incurred a net operating loss for its initial tax year and the taxpayers treated their proportionate shares of the bank loan as shareholder loans, creating bases against which their
distributive shares of the net operating loss were deducted.'
The IRS challenged the deduction, claiming that the bank loan was not shareholder
debt under §1366(d)(1)(B) and denied the taxpayers a deduction for the S corporation's
71 Id. at 773.

72 Id. at 774.
7

Id.

74 Id. at 775.
s 56 T.C.M. (P-H) 1987-137.
76 Id.
v

Id.
SId. at 138.

79

Id.

@ Id.
1 Id.
82 Id.
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net operating loss. 3 The taxpayers claimed the restructured loan should be treated as a
loan from them to the corporation." The taxpayers argued that they were, in substance,
the primary obligors on the bank loan and that the rationale expressed in Selfe should
apply to their case.' 5
The Tax Court held the bank loan was not, in substance, a shareholder loan and
disallowed the losses claimed by the taxpayers on their individual tax retums.86 The court
found no evidence in the documentation of the restructured debt instruments to indicate
the taxpayers were the primary obligors or that the bank considered the taxpayers the
primary obligors.17 The court found the debt to run between the bank and the corporation.8s With regard to the application of the Selfe rationale, the court stated:
We have reservations with regard to the application of the reasoning inSelfe
v. UnitedStates absent an argument being made that the debt in question
should be considered a contribution to the capital of the corporation rather
than debt of the corporation. The parties have not made this argument.
Further, ptitioners have not established that CNB looked primarily to them
for satisfaction of the debt.89
If the taxpayers had sought to characterize the transaction as an indirect capital
contribution, the court in Bader might have been persuaded to adopt the rationale in
Selfe, because of the fact that the original loans were direct shareholder loans clearly
creating basis under §1366(d)(1)(B) prior to the restructuring. However, the court may
well have held in favor of the government absent a stronger case by the taxpayers that
the bank looked to them for repayment of the loan?°
In Gurda v. Commissioner,9 shareholders attempted to increase basis in their S
corporation by loans obtained by the S corporation from a related corporation which had
borrowed the funds from an unrelated financial institution.92 The Tax Court held that the
transaction did not give rise to additional basis for the shareholders and that Selfe
did not help the taxpayer:
10 Id. at 139.
B4

Id.

'3

Id.

'

Id. at 140.

87

Id.

0

Id. at 139.

89 Id. at 140.
91 Bader was decided prior to Estate of Leavitt v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 206 (1988) aff'd, 875 F.2d 420 (4th Cir.
1989), and the Tax Court's opinion in Leavitt certainly renders the language in Bader quoted above much less
significant than it might otherwise be. See discussion infra p. 13.
91 56 T.C.M.(P-H) 1987-2023.
92 Id. at 2023-24.
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Selfe v. United States,supra,does not apply to this case. The Selfe holding
is premised on proof that the lender looks primarily to the guarantor/shareholder forrepayment ofthe corporation's debt. In this case. HNB, the thirdparty lender, looks primarily to Wallkill, the borrower, for repayment ofthe
loan. Therefore, the guarantees given by the Gurdas and the Slutskys do
not give rise to liability for repayment of the loan sufficient to establish that
Wallkill's subsequent loan of the funds to Speedways represents an equity
investment which would increase theirbasis in tir stock in that corporation.
The Tax Court did not take this opportunity to repudiate the rationale of Selfe, but
chose to distinguish Gurdaon the facts. For this reason, Gurdacould be seen as suggesting the Selfe rationale has merit, but that the rationale simply did not apply to the facts
presented. However, in light of subsequent Tax Court cases, it seems more likely that
the Tax Court may have been simply deciding the case before it. 94
3. Estate of Leavitt v. United States
The case that appears to be cited most often for the proposition that shareholder
guarantees of corporate loans will not be treated as capital contributions is Estate of
Leavitt v. UnitedStates.95 In Leavitt, the taxpayers sought to deduct their distributive
shares of operating losses incurred by their S corporation." The deductions were taken
against their pro rata shares of a bank loan to the corporation in the total amount of
$300,000. 7 The shareholders guaranteed the bank loan.98 At the time ofthe bank loan,
the corporation was insolvent, its liabilities exceeded the value of its assets. 99 During its
first tax year (a short year of seven months) the corporation generated a loss of $265,000
and was unable to generate the cash flow necessary to operate. 100 The corporation had
virtually no assets to use as collateral.10' The corporation's financial statements classified the $300,000 bank loan as a shareholder loan although payments on the loan were
made by the corporation and were not treated as distributions to the shareholders."°
The shareholders treated the bank loan as a shareholder loan under §1366(d)(1)(B)
and deducted their distributive share of the loss."°3 The Service denied the losses on the
I at 2027.
Id.
See Estate of Leavitt, 90 T.C. at 206; see also Nigh v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M.(P-H) 1990-1657.
Estate of Leavitt v. Commissioner, 875 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 421.

Id.
Id.
Id.
101 Id. at 421 n. 4.
101 Id. at 421-22.
',

m

Id. at 422.
Id.
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grounds that the bank loan was not a shareholder loan under §1366(d)(1)(B).' 4 The Tax
Court decided the case in the favor of the Service, holding that shareholder guarantees
of the bank loan did not convert the third-party loan into a shareholder loan under
§1366(d)(1)(B) or an indirect capital contribution under §1366(d)(1)(A). 105 In deciding
that the taxpayer was not allowed to recharacterize the loan as a capital contribution the
Tax Court held that in order for a shareholder to increase basis under §1366(d), there
must be an economic outlay."° After analyzing the form of the transaction the Tax Court
found no economic outlay, concluding that since the taxpayer's guarantees did not
require any actual payment during the years in issue, there could be no increase in basis.1°7
The Tax Court declined the invitationofthe taxpayerto apply traditional debt-equity
principles to determine whether the guaranteed debt was in substance a capital contribution by the shareholders.Y0 The Tax Court specifically rejected the holding in Selfe
that a shareholder guaranty of a loan to his S corporation may be treated as a contribution
to capital by the shareholder when traditional debt-equity analysis indicates the shareholder should be treated as though he borrowed the money from the third-party lender
and contributed the loan proceeds to the S corporation.10 9 The Tax Court held that
shareholder guarantees may not be treated as an investment in an S corporation absent
an economic outlay by its shareholders and that traditional debt-equity analysis is inap110
propriate in the case of an S corporation.
Citing language from the Senate Finance Committee's report, the Tax Court concluded that the drafters of I.R.C. §1374(c)(2) (the statutory predecessor to I.R.C.
§1366(d)(1)) intended to require an actual economic outlay:"' "Congress has promulgated a set of rules designed to limit the amount of deductions allowable to a shareholder
of a Subchapter S corporation to the amount he has actually invested in the corporation

1I4

Id.

'

Leavitt, 90 T.C. at 206. The Tax Court cited Raynor v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 762 (1968), for the proposition

that no form of indirect borrowing is treated as a shareholder loan unless the shareholder actually pays part or all of

the obligation. Estate of Leavitt, 90 T.C. at 211.
101Id. at 212. The Tax Court cited Brown v. United States, 706 F.2d 755 (6th Cir. 1983), for the proposition that an
economic outlay is required for purposes of § 1366(d)(l)(A) and (d)(l)(B). Leavitt, 90 T.C. at 212.
lul Id. at 213.
'16

Id. at 215.

19 Id. at216.
110 Id.

. Id. at 217. The language cited from the Senate Finance Committee's report is as follows:
The amount of the net operating loss apportioned to any shareholder pursuant to the above rule is
limited under section 1374(c)(2) to the adjusted basis of the shareholder's investment in the corporation; that is, to the adjusted basis of the stock in the corporation owned by the shareholder and the
adjusted basis of any indebtedness of the corporation to the shareholder. [S. REP. No. 1983, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), 1958-3 C.B. 1141. [Emphases added.].
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and the amounts
of income from the corporation included in the shareholder's gross
112
income."
The taxpayers appealed the decision of the Tax Court to the Fourth Circuit, which
affirmed the Tax Court's decision.' The Fourth Circuit adopted the holding of the Tax
Court that shareholders' guarantees of third-party loans to their S corporation do not
create basis absent an economic outlay by the shareholders. "4
Under the analysis provided by the Fourth Circuit, the use of debt-equity principles
to characterize a bank loan as a shareholder loan is inappropriate until it has been
determined that an economic outlay has been made by the shareholder:
We believe that the Tax Court correctly refused to apply debt-equity principles here, a methodology which is only relevant, if at all, to resolution of
the second inquiry - what is the nature of the economic outlay. Of course,
the second inquiry cannot be reached unless the first question concerning
whether an economic outlay exists is answered affirmatively. Here itis not.
The appellants, in effect, attempt to collapse a two-step analysis into a onestep inquiry which would eliminate the initial determination of economic
outlay by first concluding that the proceeds were a capital contribution
(equity). Obviously, a capital contribution is an economic outlay so the
basis in the stock would be adjusted according. But such an approach
simply ignores the factual determinationby theTax Courtthatthe Banklent
the $300,000 to the corporation and not to the Shareholders-Guarantors. 11
Under this two-step approach, the court never reaches the debt-equity analysis,
since it refuses to overturn the Tax Court's finding that the shareholders did not make an
economic outlay. The taxpayers cited Blum and Selfe to support their position that the
application of debt-equity principles is appropriate in the context of a third-party loan to
an S corporation and argued that its application would result in an economic outlay in
the form of a deemed capital contribution.
The Fourth Circuit found Blum to be no impediment to its two-step approach in
determining whether a shareholder has made an investment in his S corporation. The
court found that Biwn did not apply debt-equity principles to determine whether a

2

Id. at 216.

113 Estate of Leavitt v. Commissioner, 875 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1989).
114

Id. at 422.

"-

Id. at 425.
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shareholder guarantee of a loan from a bank to his corporation was an indirect capital

contribution."1 6 According to the Fourth Circuit, the taxpayer simply misread Blwn.

17

With regard to Selfe, the Fourth Circuit found that language in the Eleventh Circuit's
opinion implies a two-step analysis where debt-equity analysis is engaged in only after
an economic outlay is established."' t However, the Fourth Circuit was concerned with
the following final statement of the Selfe opinion: "In short, we remand for the district
court to apply PlantationPatternsand determine if the bank loan to Jane Simon, Inc.,

was in reality aloan to the taxpayer."' 9 The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the suggestion
in Selfe that debt-equity principles should be applied to determine whether the shareholder should be treated as the borrower when a third party loans money directly to the
shareholder's S corporation: "It is because of the Selfecourt's suggestion that debt-equity

principles must be applied to resolve the question of whether the bank actually lent the
money to the taxpayer/shareholder or the corporation, that we must part company with
the Eleventh Circuit for the reasons stated above."'"
4. Leavitt's Progeny Continues Requirement of Economic Outlay

Since the Leavittdecision, the Tax Court has entrenched its position that shareholder
guarantees do not provide a shareholder the opportunity to deduct his distributive share

of S corporation losses under debt-equity's indirect capital contribution rationale. In
Suisman v. Commissioner,2' a case decided after Leavitt, the Tax Court again declined
a taxpayer's suggestion to follow the rationale in Selfe. t22 The taxpayers in Suisman
formed an S corporation to operate a boat charter business.t23 The corporation borrowed

funds from a bank and the shareholders guaranteed the loan. t24 Two years after the

116Id.
Id.
...Id. at 426,427. The Fourth Circuit states:
117

The Selfe court found that there was evidence that the bank primarily looked to the taxpayer and not
the corporation for repayment of the loan. Therefore, it remanded for a detennination of whether
or not the bank primarily looked to Jane Selfe [taxpayer] for repayment [the first inquiry] and for
the court to apply the factors set out in In re Lane and I.R.C. section 385 todetermine if the taxpayer's
guarantee amounted to either an equity investment in or shareholder loan to Jane Simon, Inc. [the
second inquiry] Id. at 775. The implications are that there is still a two-step analysis and that the
debt-equity principles apply only to the determination of the characterization of the economic
outlay, once one is found.
Id.
Selfe v. United States, 778 F.2d 769, 775 (11 th Cir. 1985).
Estate of Leavitt, 875 F.2d at 427.
121 58 T.C.M.(P-H4) 1989-3174.
" See id. at 3175-76.
19

'=

121

Id. at 3174.

124

Id.
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original loan, the corporation sold its boat and made a large payment to the bank.' The
corporation executed a note to the bank for the remaining loan balance, and the taxpayers
guaranteed payment on the new note. 12
The taxpayer argued that his basis in the corporation should be increased by the
guaranteed loan, citing Selfe. 27 The Tax Court rejected the taxpayer's argument and
accepted the economic outlay argument set forth in Leavitt. 12 The Tax Court found no
economic outlay since the loan payments were made by the corporation and were not
treated as constructive dividends by the corporation. 29 In light of its reliance onLeavitt,
Suisman could be viewed as a restatement of the Tax Court's intractability on the Selfe
issue. However, in its determination that no economic outlay was made, Suisman
appears to put great emphasis on who paid off the loan. One wonders if the court's
decision would have been different had the corporation recorded the loan repayments as
constructive dividends.
In Harris v. United States,3" the taxpayers had contracted to purchase a pornographic theater that they intended to convert into a wedding hall. 3' In an effort to avoid
any adverse publicity that might arise due to their purchase of a pornographic theater, to
limit their personal liability, and to enhance their chances of obtaining financing through
industrial revenue bonds, the taxpayers formed a corporation to acquire the property.3 2
The corporation elected to be taxed an S corporation. 33 The taxpayers had made tentative arrangements to finance the project in their individual capacities, but the final loan
agreement was between the newly formed corporation and the bank."'" The shareholders
each executed personal continuing guarantees of the corporation's indebtedness. ' The
bank was given a mortgage on the theater. 3 In addition, the shareholders secured the
bank loan with certificates of deposit. 37 An officer of the bank testified that the loan was
intended to be made to the corporation, but that the bank looked primarily to the taxpayers, rather than the corporation, for repayment of the loan.'3

12"

Id. at 3175.

126 Id.
127 Id.
In1

Id.

anId. at 3176.
'3

902 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1990).
I at 440.
Id.

13

Id.

133 Id.
1"4 Id.
13

Id.

16

Id.

137 Id.
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The taxpayers deducted losses in the corporation in excess of their actual capital
contributions. They took the position that the bank loan was, in substance, an indirect
capital contribution against which their distribution share of Scorporation loss could be
deducted. 139 The Internal Revenue Service disagreed. 14°
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court, granting summary
judgment in favor of the government. The Fifth Circuit cited favorably the language in
Leavitt that requires a finding of actual economic outlay on the part of a shareholder prior
to any debt-equity analysis.' 41 According to the Fifth Circuit, Selfe was not applicable
to the case before it since, "... . the transaction as structured did not lack adequate

substance or reality and.., an economic outlay justifying the basis claimed by
taxpayers never occurred."142
The court then reviewed the evidence in support of its order affirming summary
judgement 43 The parties intended the transaction to be a loan from the bank to the
corporation.'" The notes were executed by the corporation." The loan proceeds were
used by the corporation to purchase the theater, the corporation took title to the property. " Interest due notices were sent to the corporation and payments on the loan were
made by the corporation. 47 The corporation's books and records reflected the loan as
a debt owed to the bank (rather than as a capital contribution) and payments were treated
as interest payments by the corporation (rather than distributions to the taxpayers).'4
The Fifth Circuit did not discuss the applicability of the Selfe rationale to the case
before it in connection with evidence that the bank looked to the shareholders of the S
corporation for repayment of the loan. According to Selfe, such a finding necessitates
an investigation into the substance of the transaction to determine whether the shareholder guarantee amounts to a capital contribution by the shareholder. The Fifth Circuit
in Harrisdetermined the substance of the transaction by simply analyzing the docu-

"'

Id.at441.

140 Id.

" Id. at 442. The Fifth Circuit determined that the pledging of security by a shareholder is not an economic outlay
justifying an increase in basis. Harris,902 F.2d at 445. Leavitt did not include a claim by the taxpayer that pledging
collateral is an economic outlay, and the Fourth Circuit left open the question of"... whether a guarantee can be an
economic outlay when accompanied by pledged collateral." Estate of Leavitt v. United States, 875 F.2d 420, 42627, n.17 (4th Cir. 1989).
11 Harris, 902 F.2d at 443.
110 ld. at 443.
144 Id.

141 Id. at 443-44.
146 Id. at 444.
147 Id.
140 Id.
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ments prepared in support of the bank loan.149 The order affirming summaryjudgement
cannot be reconciled with Selfe and the court in Harrismade no real attempt to do so.
In Nigh v. Commissioner,"5°the Tax Court held that shareholders of an Scorporation
were not entitled to treat third-party loans made to their S corporation as capital contributions.151 InNigh,the lenders (two different banks) obtained notes from the corporation
and its shareholders as co-makers.1 2 This was the standard policy of the banks on all
loans to closely held corporations.'53 The banks would
not have made the loans to the
u
corporation without the shareholders' signatures.'
The taxpayers argued that as co-makers of the notes, they had, in substance, borrowed the funds from the banks and contributed the loan proceeds to the capital of the
corporation. 55 The Tax Court rejected the taxpayers' argument, citing language from
its opinion in Leavitt that absent an economic outlay by the shareholder, no tax basis is
obtained by a shareholder in the case of third-party loans to a corporation, regardless
of whether the shareholder was a co-maker or guaranteed the loan. 56
The Nigh case is a reaffirmation by the Tax Court ofits position expressed inLeavitt.
Suisman and Nigh certainly suggest that taxpayers willing to litigate the debt-equity
issue in the context of a third-party loan to an S corporation should either choose a different
court of original jurisdiction or be willing to take their fight to the court of appeals.'
Two-Step ApproachRequired to Apply Debt-Equity Principles
1. The Leavitt Test
The Leavitt case and its progeny argue that there must be an actual economic outlay
by the shareholder before traditional debt-equity principles will be applied to determine
whether the nature of the transaction is a loan or a capital contribution. As stated in
Leavitt,this is a two-step approach. An actual economic outlay must first be found before
proceeding to the second step; determining whether the outlay is a loan or a capital
contribution. However, it is only after the facts and circumstances surrounding the
149

Id. at 443,444.

1- 59 T.C.M.(P-H) 1990-1657.

13 ld. at 1662.
L1 Id. at 1658.
m Id.
154 Id.

1-u Id. at 1662.
I6

Id.

L" Other Tax Court cases are equally cool to the Selfe rational. See Erwin v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M.(P-H) 1989379. In addition, the Fourth Circuit (Leavitt), Fifth Circuit (Harris),and Sixth Circuit (Brown)are notfriendly forums
for a taxpayer seeking acceptance of the Selfe rational.
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transaction are analyzed that the nature of the transfer of funds by the third-party lender
to the corporation can be determined. The substance, not the form, of the transaction
should determine its characterization.'5 8 The Leavitt line of cases fail to engage in this
analysis and instead look at the form (as opposed to the substance) of the transaction to
determine that no economic outlay occurs. Under the analysis provided by Leavin, no
other conclusion could be reached.
In the context ofa bank loan guaranteed by a shareholder, the form of the transaction
precludes an actual economic outlay by the shareholder (the money is transferred from
the bank to the corporation). The Leavitt Tax Court, in determining the nature of the
transaction, states:
The Bank of Virginia loaned the dollars to the Corporation and not to the
petitioners... Nor were the payments on the loan reported as constructive
dividends on the corporation's Federal income tax returns or on petitioner's
Federal income tax returns during the years in issue. Accordingly, we find
that the transaction was in fact a loan by the bank to the corporation guaranteed by the shareholders." 9
In essence, the Tax Court in Leavitt looked at the form of the transaction, rather than the
substance, to determine that no economic outlay occurred.
Although the Tax Court in Leavitt flatly refused to adopt debt-equity principles in
the context of shareholder guarantees of S corporation debt, the Fourth Circuit was not
ready to make such a declaration. However, in the context of shareholder guarantees of
third-party loans, the two-step approach adopted by the Fourth Circuit puts the taxpayer
in no better position than he faces in the Tax Court. Without rejecting the use of debtequity principles in the context of an S corporation and its shareholders, the Fourth
Circuit's first step in its two-step analysis - requirement of an actual economic outlay serves to eliminate any consideration of debt-equity principles.
This has a negative impact on a shareholder who has guaranteed a third-party loan
to his S corporation. If the court is unwilling to consider the substance (as opposed to
the form) of the transaction between the bank, shareholder, and the S corporation in
determining whether there has been an economic outlay (and it appears the courts in
Leavitt line of cases are unwilling), debt-equity analysis will never be engaged in.

" See Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Commissioner, 462 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1992); In Re Breit, 460 F. Supp. 873 (E.D.
Va. 1978).
" Estate of Leavitt v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 206, 214 (1988), affd, 875 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1989).
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2. The Problem with the Leavitt Test
Debt-equity principles are normally used to determine whether a shareholder
loaned money or contributed capital to his corporation.'6 The resolution of this issue is
significant to the shareholder of a Subchapter C corporation. The repayment of the debt,
normally a nontaxable event, could be treated as a taxable dividend distribution if the
transaction cast in the form of a shareholder loan is recast as a capital contribution. In
the case of a shareholder and his S corporation, the resolution of the debt-equity issue
in the case of a direct transfer from the shareholderto his corporation is irrelevant, at least
with respect to deducting entity-level operating losses, since losses can be taken against
capital contributions and shareholder loans.16 ' However, in cases such as Plantation
Patterns,the issue is not whether the shareholder directly loaned money or contributed
capital to his corporation, but rather, whether a loan from a third party to the corporation
should be treated, for tax purposes, as aloanto the shareholder followed by a contribution
of capital by the shareholder to the corporation. The substance of the transaction which
takes the form of a third-party loan to the corporation is analyzed to determine whether
the form of the transaction should be conclusive for tax purposes. BIwn and Selfe held
that the substance of a loan transaction should be analyzed in a case involving an S
corporation shareholder's guarantee of a third-party loan to his corporation, just as it
should in a case involving the same shareholder and the same transaction when his
corporation does not have an S election in effect.
The Tax Court in Leavittheld that the PlantationPatternsline of debt-equity analysis is inappropriate in a case involving an S corporation and cites language from the
Senate Finance Committee report to support its position." However, the language
relied on by the Tax Court says only that the S corporation shareholder's loss should be
limited to his investment in the corporation. The committee report does not state that an
actual economic outlay is required. Thus the legislative history simply does not support
the Tax Court position.
The Fourth Circuit in Leavittaccepted the Tax Court's conclusion that no economic
outlay was made by the taxpayer, and thereby accepted an analysis oftheloan transaction's
form rather than its substance. 6 In Leavitt, the Fourth Circuit concluded, "... the Tax
I
i
'
I

Montclair, Inc. v. United States, 318 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1963).
I.R.C. § 1366(d)(1) (1988).
Estate of Leavitt, 90 T.C. at 217.
In analyzing the substance the transaction, the Tax Court states:
The Bank of Viginia loaned the money to the corporation and not to petitioners. The proceeds of
the loan were to be used in the operation of the corporation's business. Petitioners submitted no
evidence that they were free to dispose of the proceeds of the loan as they wished. Nor were the
payments on the loan reported as constructive dividends on the corporation's Federal income tax
retums or on petitioners' Federal income tax returns during the years in issue. Accordingly, we find
that the transaction was in fact a loan by the bank to the corporation guaranteed by the shareholders.

Estate of Leavitt, 90 T.C. at 213. 214.
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Court conectly focused on the initial inquiry of whether an economic outlay existed.
Finding none, the issue of whether debt-equity principles ought to apply to determine the
nature of the economic outlay was not before the Tax Court."'"
If the Fourth Circuit was not rejecting the use of debt-equity principles in a case
involving an S corporation and its shareholders, then it should have remanded the case
to the Tax Court due to the Tax Court's failure to adequately address the initial inquiry
demanded by the Fourth Circuit, namely was there an economic outlay? The Tax Court
focused on the form of the transaction only and not on the substance. The Tax Court could
not have found an economic outlay by the shareholder since it refused to apply PlantationPatterns.The approach taken by the Tax Court fails to consider the economic outlay
deemed to be made by a shareholder who, under the PlantationsPatternsrationale, is
treated for tax purposes as though he actually contributed capital to his corporation.'"
The Tax Court inLeavitt never looked at the substance ofthe loantransaction. The credit
worthiness of the corporation, the lack of assets available as collateral, the insolvency
of the corporation, and on whom the bank relies for repayment were not addressed in
determining whether there was an economic outlay by the shareholder. The form of the
transaction apparently answers the initial question.
The Fourth Circuit would restrict the use of debt-equity principles in a case involving shareholder guarantees by requiring a finding of an actual economic outlay before
applying those principles. This restriction amounts to a de facto rejection of the use of
debt-equity principles in the case of a shareholder guarantee of a third-party entity-level loan.
An unwillingness to apply debt-equity principles to determine whether a third-party
loan is, in reality, a loan to a shareholder cannot be reconciled with I.R.C. §137 1. Section
1371 provides that except to the extent inconsistent with Subchapter S, Subchapter C
applies to an S corporation and its shareholders.'" The debt-equity principles discussed
in PlantationPatternsare reflected in Subchapter C.167
There is no provision in Subchapter S with which the debt-equity rules are inconsistent. The Tax Court's reliance, (and to a lesser degree, the Fourth Circuit Court's
reliance) on the language found in the Senate Finance Committee's report is misplaced.
The committee report states only that the currently deductible amount of the
shareholder's distributive share of the S corporation's loss should be limited to his
investment in the corporation.'" The report's statement that a shareholder's ability to
deduct losses from his S corporation should be limited to his "investment" in the corpoI"
"~

Estate of Leavitt v. United States, 875 F.2d 420,427 (4th Cir. 1989).
Estate of Leavitt, 90 T.C. at 219 (Fay, J., dissenting).
I.R.C. § 1371(a)(1) (1988).
See I.R.C. § 385 (1988 & Supp. I1 1991).
5. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), 1958-3 C.B. 922, 1141.
S
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ration is certainly not a clear prohibition against utilizing debt-equity principles. An
actual economic outlay is not required by the language in the report. The language from
the committee report can be more easily interpreted to mean that a shareholder can
deduct his share of an S corporation loss in an amount that the normal corporate rules
- including debt-equity rules - determine to be his investment in the corporation.
The untenability of the Leavitt rationale is evident if one considers a shareholder
who has guaranteed payment on a third-party loan to his corporation. Suppose, under
the debt-equity principles enunciated in PlantationPatterns,a loan transaction in the
form of a bank loan to a corporation is recharacterized for tax purposes as a loan to the
shareholder followed by a capital contribution to his corporation. While a regular C
corporation, payments made by the corporation (and recorded as debt service on the
corporation's books and records) would be treated as constructive dividends to the
shareholder. Assume the corporation then made an election to be treated as an S corporation. Under the rationale of the Leavittline of cases, the shareholder could not deduct
corporate operating losses against the balance due on the third-party loan since no actual
economic outlay was made by the shareholder.
It would be unfair to the shareholder to treat the third-party loan as a capital contribution for purposes of taxing him on the corporation's payments to the bank, but not for
purposes of determining his investment in the corporation under §1366(d)(1). More
importantly (perhaps not to the shareholder), such an interpretation of the law would
violate the statutory mandate of §1371 that unless inconsistent with some provision in
Subchapter S, the rules applicable to C corporations and their shareholders should apply
to an S corporation and its shareholders.
Adopting the view of Blun and Selfe that application of debt-equity principles is
appropriate in the context of shareholder guarantees of third-party loans to an S corporation creates no inconsistency. The loan 'transactiondescribed above would be subject
to the same characterization regardless of the tax status of the corporation. Moreover,
this treatment would not afford the shareholder any advantage should he terminate his
S election. Any payments made on the loan after the termination of the S election would
be treated as distributions to the shareholder and taxed as dividends to the extent of the
corporation's earnings and profits.'69 Any loan payments made in excess of earnings and
profits would be treated in the same manner as if the shareholder had not terminated his
S election." 0 The shareholder's stock basis would be reduced by the corporation's losses
claimed by him during the period of the S election. 71 The loan payments made in excess

'
'~

r

LR.C. § 301(c)(1) (1988).
Compare LR.C. § 1368(b) (1988) with I.R.C. § 301(c)(2), (c)(3) (1988).
I.R.C. § 1367 (1988).
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of the corporation's earnings and profits would be treated as gain to the extent the
payments exceeded any remaining stock basis.172
Inconsistencies with the Positionof the IRS
The Service's insistence that an Scorporation shareholder make an actual economic
outlay prior to obtaining tax basis in the context of shareholder guarantees of third-party
loans is surprising in light of the position taken in Revenue Ruling 75-144Y.3 In Revenue
Ruling 75-144, the Service concluded that a shareholder who substitutes his note for the
note of his S corporation obtains basis against which the corporation's operating losses
may be deducted. 74
Revenue Ruling 75-144 involved a shareholder who guaranteed payment of a loan
made by a bank to the shareholder's S corporation. 175 The corporation defaulted on the
loan. 176 The shareholder was called up to fulfill his obligation as guarantor. 177 The bank
accepted the shareholder's own promissory note for the corporate note, which was
canceled by the bank upon receipt of the shareholder's note. 78
A guarantor who pays a debt of the primary obligor is subrogated to the rights of the
lender.179 When the bank canceled the corporation's note and accepted the shareholder's
personal note in satisfaction of the shareholder's obligation as guarantor, the shareholder
became the creditor of his corporation. 1w0 The Service concluded that the shareholder's
basis in the obligation is equal to the face amount of his personal note. 8' The Service
held that under the facts presented, on the date the corporation's note was canceled and
the shareholder note was issued, shareholder indebtedness arose and the shareholder
may deduct corporation operating losses against the newly created shareholder loan.
One could question the existence of an economic outlay in the situation described
in Revenue Ruling 75-144. Although the shareholder satisfied the corporation's indebtedness, it did not cost him anything. In light of the Service's position that an actual
economic outlay is required before a shareholder can obtain basis under §1366(d)(1), it
172 I.R.C. § 301(cX2), (c)(3) (1988).

17 Rev. Rul. 75-144. 1975-1 C.B. 277.
174 Id.

17 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.

"I

Id. at 278.

179 Id.
18D Id.
181 Id.

Im Id.
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is surprising that a substitution of notes would be satisfactory in garnering basis for
the shareholder." 3

Revenue Ruling 75-144 demonstrates the Service's willingness to use the concept
of subrogation to allow a shareholder to obtain basis without an actual economic outlay.
In the case of a renegotiated third-party loan where the shareholder substitutes his note
for the corporation's note, the transfer offunds (actual economic outlay) likewise comes
from the third-party lender. The shareholder who has substituted his note for a note of
his corporation has parted with no more than he has parted with in the case of his
guarantee of a third-party loan. Without some sound tax policy justification, it seems
inconsistent that the Service would argue against a shareholder's use of the well established debt-equity concept in the case of a third-party loan.
Acceptance of the Selfe rationale could raise the issue of whether a deemed capital
contribution cast in the form of a third-party loan creates a second class of stock. I" The
Service might argue that if the rights of the shareholders in their stock differ from the
rights of the creditor with respect to the loan, treating the loan as a capital contribution
creates a second class ofstock, resulting in the termination ofthe Selection. 185 However,
it is unlikely that a third-party loan creates a second class of stock. The Code itself
provides that straight debt will not be treated as a second class of stock.I86 A third-party
loan would likely meet the definition of straight debt. Recently issued treasury regulations provide additional comfort that the Selfe rationale will not result in the termination
of a corporation's S election. 1
CONCLUSION

Subchapter C specifically authorizes the use of debt-equity principles to
recharacterize a loan as a capital contribution. Section 1371 provides that unless inconsistent with provisions ofsubchapter S,the rules generally applicable to corporations and
shareholders (i.e. subchapterC) apply to an Scorporation as well. Therefore, unless there
is a provision in subchapter S that is inconsistent with the application of debt-equity
principles, §1371 demands that a third-party loan be treated as a capital contribution if
the facts and circumstances warrant recharacterization.

10

Revenue Ruling 75-144 is even more surprising when one considers the Service's conclusion in Rev. Rul. 81187,1981-2 C.B. 167. According to Revenue Ruling 81-187, no basis is obtained by a shareholder who transfers his
promissory note to his S corporation. Id.
II.R.C. § 1361(b)(l)(D) prevents an S corporation from having more than one class of stock. See I.R.C. §
1361(b)(1)(D) (1988).
LR.C. § 1362(d)(2) (1988).
I I.R.C. § 1361(c)(5) (1988).
"7 Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(c) (1992).
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The Leavitt line of cases refuse to apply debt-equity principles in the case of third-

party entity-level debt of an Scorporation, either by rejecting outright the application of
debt-equity principles orby requiring an actual economic outlay by the shareholder. The
legislative history relied on by Leavitt is not conclusive. Indeed, the committee report
language cited by Leavitt can easily be interpreted as approving the application of

debt-equity principles.
Utilizing debt-equity principles would bring the tax treatment of S corporation

shareholders closer to the tax treatment ofpartners in a partnership. This is the overriding
purpose of subchapter S. Refusing to extend debt-equity principles to an S corporation
only serves to frustrate this legislative purpose. It also creates complexity in the tax law,
creates costly renegotiations of entity-level loan agreements, and causes unfair, anomalous results for taxpayers.
Regardless of the statutory support and the sound tax policy reasons for utilizing
debt-equity principles in the case of third-party loans, taxpayers seeking to deduct
corporate losses against stock provided by third-party loan transactions should proceed
with caution. Simply guaranteeing a corporation's debt is not enough; facts and circumstances indicating the loan was, in substance, a capital contribution must be present
before the Selfe rationale could be offered in support of the deduction. The safer approach would be to renegotiate the loan, changing the documentation to reflect the
shareholder as the primary obligor. Any new debt financing should be structured as a
loan from the bank to the shareholder, followed by either a capital contribution or
a shareholder loan.
Perhaps a shareholder in an S corporation should be treated like a partner in a
partnership with respect to entity-level indebtedness.' This approach would be consistent with the underlying purpose of subchapter S - allow the owners of a closely held
corporation to choose to be treated as a partnership for tax purposes. No purpose is
served by the current state of the law involving shareholder guarantees of S corporation
debt, except to provide a trap for the unwary shareholder who failed to talk to his tax
adviser before arranging financing at the bank. Once the shareholder discovers the
potentially different tax treatment, he can correct his "mistake" by going to the bank and
renegotiating the corporate debt. Unfortunately for the shareholder, substantial legal
fees and finance charges may be incurred in the process.
If Congress were to adopt the partnership approach to determine an S corporation
shareholder's basis for deducting losses, entity-level indebtedness of the corporation
would be allocated to those shareholders who bear the risk of being called upon to pay

See John R. Dorocak, Shareholder Guarantees ofS Corporation Debt: Why Not Increase Basis?, 4 J. S CORP.
TAX'N. 56 (1992).
'0
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the debt. Only those shareholders guaranteeing a corporate debt would share in the
allocation. Corporate losses could be deducted by a shareholder against basis provided
by the debt. The amount realized on the sale of stock in an S corporation would include
the shareholder's portion of guaranteed corporate debt, unless the selling shareholder
remains liable on the guarantee. In other words, shareholders would be treated like
partners with respect to guaranteed entity-level indebtedness.
Extending partnership treatment of entity-level debt to third-party loans to Scorporations would bring the tax treatment of shareholders even closer to that of partners.
Increasing a shareholder's tax basis for guaranteed loans without regard to debt-equity
principles would further the tax policy underlying subchapter S. However, congressional action is necessary to effect such a change. In the mean time, accepting debtequity principles in the subchapter Scorporation context does justice to the taxpayer, to
the statutory provisions currently in place, and to the legislative purpose underlying
subchapter S.
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